
















Numerous evidence demonstrate that firms affiliated with business groups in 
emerging markets outperform their independent counterparts. One of the proposed 
explanations for such a phenomenon is the more advanced groups’ internal markets  
structure compared to the rest of the economy. In this paper we test the hypothesis 
that internal capital markets within Russian business groups overcome the liquidity 
constraints problem widely spread outside groups. Our findings indicate that even if 
the groups’ internal capital markets do exist in Russian business groups, their 
efficiency is rather doubtful and the access to external financing by firms affiliated 
with the groups is constrained. 
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  11. Introduction 
Business groups of various nature and organization structure rule the economic life in 
many countries. Khanna and Ghemawat (1998) survey the existing studies and   
indicate a significant role of diversified business groups in a number of emerging 
market economies and in some developed as well. 
While there are both theoretical and empirical evidence that firm’s participation in 
business groups in developed countries could be value reducing (Scharfstein and 
Stein, 2000, Montgomery, 1994) there is substantial empirical evidence that business 
groups in developing countries surpass independent firms in terms of economic 
performance (Khanna, 2000, Khanna and Rivkin, 1999, Keister, 1998, Chang and 
Choi, 1988). The most popular explanations for this phenomena are: minority 
shareholder exploitation, market power, better treatment by national government and 
the alleviation of market imperfections by groups (Khanna and Ghemawat, 1998). A 
number of studies emphasize the group ability to overcome capital market 
underdevelopment typical for emerging economies by substituting it with efficient 
internal capital market. The theoretical justification for this  comes from the idea that 
lower information asymmetry within groups compared to the rest of the economy 
could help to mitigate the problem of contract enforcement and reduce the severity of 
liquidity constraints for affiliated firms. 
The obvious way to test the hypothesis of the better financial institutions within group 
is to study business groups in the economies with the least developed financial 
markets. And the example of Russian economy whose characteristic features are 
highly inefficient capital market and wide prevalence of business groups could serve 
for this purpose. In this paper we empirically test the hypothesis of efficiency of 
Russian groups’ internal capital markets over the period 1999-2002. We do this by  
examining the difference in the liquidity constraints faced by Russian firms affiliated 
with business groups on one hand and independent firms on the other.  
The only test of the hypothesis of better institutions within Russian groups compared 
to the rest of the economy that we are familiar with is that of Perotti and Gelfer 
(2001), who investigated the difference in investment-cash flow sensitivity between  
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finding is that investments positively and significantly depend on internal cash flows 
for standalone firms and firms from industrial groups, while this relation is significant 
and negative for groups with a hierarchical structure head by banks. Suggested 
interpretation for these results is that there is either an internal capital market within 
bank-led groups which redirects finances to firms with better investment 
opportunities, or the controlling bank opportunistically transfers the value. 
There are however some concerns regarding these results. There are only 17 firms in 
this study, which belong to bank-led groups, and 17 firms from industry groups. 
Therefore the statistical significance of the results seems to be quite low.  
Another problem with a methodology exploit by Perotti and Gelfer was first pointed 
out by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Their argument is that empirically estimated 
investment-cash flow sensitivity can be significant and positive even if the firms 
under study do not face liquidity constraints. The reason is that since there are no 
ideal proxies of firms’ investment opportunities and cash-flow itself can be a good 
proxy for this then an empirically estimated significant positive relation between cash 
flow and level of investments could hardly be interpreted as a measure of liquidity 
constraints. This argument seems to be especially important for emerging markets 
because of highly inefficient and narrow stock market whose data on firms 
capitalization we need to rely upon to estimate firms’ market-to-book ratios. 
In order to perform an empirical comparison of two sets of firms in terms of their 
access to external financial resources that is not marked by the above endogeneity 
problem we use the test developed by Almeida et al. (2003). This test is based on the 
effect of financial constraints on firm policies and, particularly, on firm’s decision to 
save cash out of incremental cash inflows. While constrained firms facing the 
uncertainty in the ability to get external funds as they would be required in the future 
will tend to save more cash from current cash flows, the unconstraint firms that are 
able more easily to get external funds should not base their decision about cash 
savings on cash inflows. Therefore we expect positive propensity to save from cash 
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constrained firms, and no such a dependence for unconstrained firms. 
Applying this test to the Russian firms we compare the cash flow sensitivities of cash 
estimated on two samples of firms - firms affiliated with business groups and 
independently operating ones. We use data on 3815 Russian firms 435 out of which 
are affiliated to business groups. Our results show that over the period 1999-2002 
there was no significant difference in the cash-flow sensitivity of cash between these 
two sets of firms, which can be regarded as evidence in favor of the inefficiency of 
internal financial markets within Russian business groups over this period of time. 
Comparing different types of business groups in the same respect  we failed to find 
any significant difference among bank-led groups, foreign owned groups and the 
others.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we review empirical evidence on the 
Russian business groups performance, section III discusses the methodology of the 
research and describes the data, and section IV presents empirical results. The last 
section concludes. 
II. Russian business groups 
The development of business groups in Russia started after the beginning of 
transition. The mass voucher privatization, whose declared objective was to create a 
diverse ownership structure in the economy, has actually served as an instrument for 
consolidation of ownership. Starting from 1993 this process was often accompanied 
by rough violations of law. Serious fighting over assets seemed to be over around 
1998 when the heads of the largest Russian business groups declared that their main 
concern was the effective governance of acquired assets. 
Their plans, however, were interrupted by the financial crisis of 1998. The worsening 
of liquidity problem because of ruble devaluation and GKO default brought about the 
reduction of stock ownership in a number of groups head by commercial banks. This, 
in turn, led to the new wave of ownership changes in Russian economy. An active 
participation of regional authorities in this redistribution was one of the most 
remarkable features of this period.  At the same time a favorable situation in the 
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significant cash inflows to groups operating in extraction industries, which help them 
expand to other sectors, such as agriculture, automobiles, medicine, construction etc.  
Boone and Rodionov (2001) analyzed the ownership structure and performance of a 
set of 64 largest Russian enterprises and found that while 43% of revenues originated 
in enterprises under state control, 41% of the remaining revenues were controlled by 
five largest industrial groups (Menatep, Interros, Russian Aluminium, Sistema and 
Alfa-Group). Guriev and Rachinskiy (2004) studied the ownership structure of 1700 
largest Russian enterprises in 2001 and found that enterprises affiliated with 22 
largest business groups  employed 42% of labor and stood for 39% of sales. As far as 
the performance of business groups is concerned, the authors provide empirical 
evidence that business groups outperformed other private firms by about 9% in terms 
of TFP growth in 2002, while their productivity level was about the same as in other 
private firms. 
Given the indications of better Russian groups’ performance over standalone firms 
we ask the question whether it is better functioning  of internal capital markets within 
groups that is responsible for this. In order to answer this question we compare the 
liquidity constraint problems experienced by firms affiliated to groups and non 
affiliated to judge the degree of improvement of groups’ internal capital markets 
compared to the economy-wide one. 
III. Methodology and data 
Based on the availability of firm level accounting data Almeida et al. (2003) suggest 
empirical test for liquidity constraints that is derived from dynamic theoretical model 
in which firms facing both present and future investment opportunities might not have 
enough internally generated cash flows to finance them. Depending on the firm’s 
ability to attract external capital, cash hoarding might be used to finance future 
investments. Comparing first-best solution for financially unconstrained firms with 
the solution for the firm facing external capital market frictions the authors find that, 
given the same investment opportunities, financially constrained firms should 
increase the stock of liquid assets in response to positive cash flow innovations, while 
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liquidity.  
In terms of empirical application this result indicates that controlling for investment 
opportunities financially constrained firms should have significantly positive cash 
flow sensitivity of cash, while this sensitivity should be insignificant for firms that are 
able to rise external liquidity without any difficulties. At the same time the results of 
the theoretical model do not allow us to compare the severity of financial constraints 
faced by the firms based on the values of propensity to save cash out of cash flows. 
That is, given this approach, the only hypothesis that we are able to test is whether the 
group of firms under the question experience liquidity constraints or not. 
This test can be reasonably applied to verify the hypothesis whether there are efficient 
internal financial markets within Russian business groups. Given that the economy-
wide financial market is very limited and the costs of rising external financing for 
Russian firms are quite large, the existence of internal financial market within 
business group could allow affiliated firms to hoard up less cash. 
In order to specify the empirical model for testing the above hypothesis we need, first 
of all, to control for the firms’ investment opportunities. The most obvious way to do 
this is to use the stock market data on firms’ market-to-book ratios as a proxy for 
firm’s investment demand. This approach being very useful and popular in developed 
economies has significant drawbacks while being applied for transition economies. 
First of all, the underdeveloped financial market implies the significant distortions of 
stock prices. Secondly, relying on stock market data we limit ourselves to a small 
dataset of firms that have frequent enough market quotations. Facing this problem we 
choose to apply the accelerator model of investment demand for the study. It is worth 
to mention that Lizal and Svejnar (1997) pointed out the workability of accelerator 
model framework in transition economies when analyzed the firm-level investment 
behavior of Czech firms. 
Given the significant variation of firms by their total asset size and following the 
approach of Almeida et al.(2003) we include the firm size as a control variable in the 
model following the argument that larger firms tend to have less cash to total asset 
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The importance of the firm’s size as one of the determinant of its financial constraints 
has been also demonstrated in the study of Russian Financial–Industrial Groups by 
Volchkova (2001).  
Therefore the basic relationship we test in the paper has the following form. 
Changes in cash holdingit=α+β*Cash flowit +γ*Cash flowit*Dbusiness groupit+      (1) 
 +δ*Sizeit+µ*Changes in salesit +ν*Changes in salei,t-1+εit 
where all variables except Size are normalized to the value of firm i total assets. 
Changes in cash holding stands for the change in firm’s cash reserves over the year, 
cash flow is estimated as firm’s operating cash flow over the year and Size is the 
logarithm of firm’s total assets. Changes in sale  and  Changes in sale-1 are current 
year and previous year changes in firm’s sales respectively,  that is, we proxy 
investment opportunities by two lags of changes in sales. Dbusiness group  is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to some business group during the year 
and 0 otherwise. 
The hypothesis that firms affiliated with groups have access to internal group’s 
financial market will be tested by estimating the value of propensity to save out of 
cash flow for unaffiliated firms, β, and comparing it with that of affiliated firms, β+γ. 
If the hypothesis that  β>0 and β+γ=0 would not be rejected we could interpret the 
results in the way that while independent Russian firms face liquidity problem 
because of underdeveloped capital market the affiliation of firms with business 
groups helps to overcome the problem of getting external financing. In order to be 
consistent with the theoretical model of Almeida et al. (2003), which provides the 
foundation for the empirical test, we consider only those firms that have positive 
operating cash flow in the year in question. 
To test the hypothesis we use annual data for Russian manufacturing joint-stock 
companies available from the Disclosure Program administered by the Federal 
Commission for Security Markets (FCSM), which requires JSC to submit balance 
sheets, financial statements and information on ownership structure, board of 
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database of annual balance sheets and financial statements for the period from 1996 
to 2002, which originally contained 21,470 observations for 4,866 manufacturing 
firms. 
For comparison of liquidity constraints between business groups and the rest of the 
economy we have constructed a list of business groups’ affiliates, with dates of their 
entry to or exit from the group. To distinguish between group and non-group firms 
we used the following criteria. Firstly, we identified major business groups and their 
core affiliates according to the information from leading experts on Russian business 
groups (Pappe, 2000). Then on the basis of information about ownership structure 
from FCSM reports in the business groups’ list we added those firms, whose major 
shareholders were group affiliates identified at the first stage. As in a number of 
occasions major shareholders were nominal owners or offshore firms, we also used 
information about affiliations of firms’ managers and members of boards of directors. 
Finally, we tracked articles mentioning firms’ entries to or exits from business groups 
in Russian journals and newspapers during the period of 1996-2002. In addition to 
identifying domestic business groups, we classified firms owned by big foreign 
companies (such as Procter&Gamble, ICN Pharmaceuticals, etc.) as a special group. 
We ended up with a data set of 674 manufacturing firms affiliated with business 
groups, whose reports were presented in the FCSM database. 
After cleaning for missing data and checking for data consistency we get a set of 
3815 firms out of which 435 firms are on the list of groups’ affiliates. By 
differentiating groups’ firms based on the specifics of groups’ ownership we single 
out  141 firms in bank-led groups and 42 firms from groups owned by foreigners. 
As a measure of investment in fixed assets we used a sum of fixed assets installed 
during the current year and changes in unfinished construction. Operational cash flow 
is measured as net profits from operations minus changes in inventories minus 
changes in receivables plus changes in payables plus depreciation expenses minus tax 
on profit. Level of cash holdings is estimated as the sum of short-term financial 
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producer price indices. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the resulting sample of firms for 2001. As 
seen from the table, group affiliated firms are on average several times larger than 
non-group firms, irrespective of whether the size is measured in terms of sales, 
employment or total assets. Nevertheless, ratios of investment, cash flow and cash 
holdings to total assets are statistically the same for both groups. Among the 
performance statistics the only one in terms of which groups’ and stand-alone firms 
behave differently is changes in sales scaled by total assets which is much higher for 
non-group firms than for groups’ affiliates. However, if we take into account that 
group firms are much bigger than independent ones this fact can hardly be surprising. 
IV. Estimation results 
We first run a basic changes in cash holding regression (1). Table 2 presents the 
results of panel data estimations with fixed effects and year dummies for 1999-2002. 
The results support our hypothesis that Russian firms face liquidity constraints. We 
obtained positive and statistically significant propensity to save out of cash flows. 
The coefficients of changes in sales are significant and positive, which is also 
expected in the framework of accelerator model of investment demand: an increase in 
sales today is one of the main determinants of  investment demand increase 
tomorrow, so firms need to hoard more cash today to meet tomorrow’s demand. 
The size of the firm has no significant effect on changes in cash stock in the sample 
of firms in this study. A possible explanation for this is that the effect of size on 
liquidity constraints in underdeveloped capital markets becomes distinguishable only 
after some threshold level of the firm size is passed and the additional research for 
this is required. 
The estimated coefficient, which interests us most, is at cash flow variable interacted 
with business group dummy and it is insignificant. It implies that firms affiliated with 
Russian business groups had similar propensity to save cash out of cash flows as their 
independent counterparts over the period 1999-2002. That is the groups’ firms face 
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result we are not able to conclude that there are no internal capital markets within 
groups. However we can argue that they are inefficient. 
In their study of Russian business group performance compared to the rest of the 
economy Guriev and Rachinskiy (2004) and Perotti and Gelfer (2001) distinguish 
among several types of business groups and in several occasions find the difference in 
performance of groups owned by foreigners compared to other groups and bank-led 
groups compared to industry groups. Therefore in our second test we run regressions 
only on groups’ affiliated firms to compare the propensity to save out of cash flow, 
first, between bank-led groups and the rest of the groups and, second, between 
business groups owned by foreigners and the rest of the groups. For these purposes 
we introduce the corresponding dummy variables and interact them with the cash 
flow variable.  
The results are presented in tables 3 and 4 respectively.  In both estimations we find 
the significant positive propensities to save out of cash flows for the whole sample 
and insignificant coefficients at interacted variables. Therefore the hypothesis of 
unconstrained behavior of foreign-owned and bank-led business groups’ affiliated 
firms is not supported. These results allow us to conclude that the type of group, 
which the firm belongs to, has no effect on the firm’s decision to save cash out of 
cash flow. That is, firms in bank-led groups or firms affiliated with foreign-owned 
groups that are liquidity constrained increase the cash stock out of current cash flows 
to be able to finance their needs afterwards. 
We check the robustness of the results by running similar regressions on each type of 
firms (standalone, groups’ affiliated, bank-led groups) separately and find that in all 
cases the coefficient of cash flow is significant and positive. We also perform the test 
for firms with positive cash flows and get a support for the above results. 
5. Conclusions 
In the paper we test a hypothesis that firms in Russian business groups have easier 
access to external financing within the groups compared to the rest of the economy, 
which allows them to overcome the liquidity constraint problem. The empirical 
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internal capital markets within Russian groups do not exist, we can argue that if such 
markets exist within groups their efficiency in terms of relaxation of liquidity 
constraints for affiliated firms is not revealed over the period of 1999-2002.  
This result seems to counter a common view that assumes the existence of internal 
capital markets within business groups to which affiliated firms have an easy access 
even if the capital markets outside the groups are underdeveloped.  Our study shows 
that it is not the case for the Russian economy. 
We argue that superior performance of Russian business groups relative to the rest of 
the economy observed in earlier studies could not be attributed to more efficient 
capital markets within the groups. Other sources of groups’ better performance need 
to be verified since the internal capital markets within Russian business groups, if 
they exist at all, are seems not to be the substitute for underdeveloped financial 
institutions outside the groups. 
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  12Table 1. Descriptive  statistics
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Number of firms    2529  355  2174 
       
mean  1.007 4.403 0.449 
std.dev. 5.37  12.85  2.076 
Sales, bln. roubles 
median 0.142  1.28  0.112 
       
mean  1.719 5.421 1.108 
std.dev. 5.028  11.099  2.56 
Employment, thous. 
median  0.549 2.198 0.459 
       
mean  1.401 5.788 0.68 
std.dev.  11.19 19.78 8.836 
Total assets (beg.of year), bln. 
roubles 
median 0.13  1.845  0.1 
       
mean  0.095 0.102 0.094 
std.dev.  0.179 0.138 0.185 
Investment/Total assets 
median  0.047 0.051 0.046 
       
mean  0.088 0.083 0.089 
std.dev.  0.211 0.223 0.209 
Cash flow/Total assets 
median  0.073 0.063 0.077 
       
mean 0.04  0.044  0.039 
std.dev.  0.077 0.083 0.076 
Cash holdings/Total assets (beg.of 
year) 
median  0.013 0.013 0.013 
       
mean  0.011 0.019 0.009 
std.dev. 0.077  0.1  0.072 
Change in cash holdings(beg.-end of 
year)/Total assets 
median  0.001 0.001 0.001 
       
mean  0.044 0.013 0.05 
std.dev.  0.478 0.449 0.482 
Change in sales (2001-2000)/Total 
assets 




                                                 
3 The number of firms for which descriptive statistics are presented in this table differs from the one 
mentioned in the paper because not all firms in the data set have data reported for all years in a row.  
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firms 
 
Dependent variable:  Changes in cash holding 
 
 
Independent variables scaled by total assets   




Operating cash flow * Dummy for business groups  0.006 
 (0.013) 
   
 
Changes in sales  0.011 
 (0.002)*** 
   
 
Changes in sales in previous year  -0.002 
 (0.002) 









Number of firms corrected  3815 
R-squared 0.06 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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affiliates 
Dependent variable:  Changes in cash holding 
 
 
Independent variables scaled by total assets   
Operating cash flow  0.095 
 (0.017)*** 
  
Operating cash flow * Dummy for business groups  -0.014 
 (0.035) 
  
Changes in sales  0.011 
 (0.007) 
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other affiliates 
Dependent variable:  Changes in cash holding 
 
 
Independent variables scaled by total assets   
Operating cash flow  0.076 
 (0.018)*** 
   
Operating cash flow * Dummy for business groups  0.052 
 (0.033) 
    
Changes in sales  0.011 
 (0.007) 
    
Changes in sales in previous year  0.011 
 (0.007) 
    
Size 0 
 (0.000)*** 




Number of firms corrected  435 
R-squared 0.06 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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